Applied Minimax Theory in Modern Politics

Two muscular fighters face off intensely. One wears orange; the other is blue. A third person watches in the background, hands clasped. Energetic mood. — In an epic showdown, two mighty warriors face each other with fierce determination as a referee stands ready in the background, set against a dramatic sky.

The US, Russia, and Minimax Strategy in Saudi Arabia

Just like we applied Game Theory in Oreshik's case, let's try to analyse upcoming US-Russian negotiations in Saudi Arabia—if they materialize. Those are not just a high-stakes diplomatic dance but a real-life case of game theory at play.

As with dealing with a monopolist supplier, each party will attempt to minimize risk while maximizing potential gains. The Minimax Theorem offers an unbiased perspective here.

Game Setup: What’s at Stake?

Negotiation frameworks often focus on value creation, which is more about damage control. The US wants to maintain pressure on Russia while avoiding escalation.

Conversely, Russia aims to break out of economic and diplomatic isolation without appearing weak. Saudi Arabia, the host, seeks to develop its credibility as a neutral power broker.

Both players (US and Russia) have two primary strategies:

US: (A) Maintain a hard stance (full sanctions, no relief) or (B) Offer partial concessions.
Russia: (A) Offer some concessions (partial withdrawal, talks) or (B) Refuse to concede and hold ground.

Each side's worst-case scenario dictates its minimax strategy—choosing the path that minimizes maximum potential loss.

The Payoff Matrix: Evaluating Outcomes

Using a simple 2×2 matrix, we can assign hypothetical payoffs:

	Russia A (Some Concessions)	Russia B (No Concessions)
US A (Hard stance)	(8, -4) – US strong, Russia forced to yield	(2, -2) – Stalemate, minimal gains
US B (Partial Concessions)	(5, 3) – Mutual compromise, moderate gains	(-3, 5) – US loses leverage, Russia wins

When applying the minimax rule, each player picks the strategy that secures the best worst-case outcome.

For the US: The worst payoff under a hard stance is 2, whereas the worst payoff under partial concessions is -3. So, the US should stick with a hard stance (A).
For Russia: The worst payoff under concessions is -4, whereas refusing to concede results in -2. So, Russia may choose to hold ground (B).

The Likely Outcome: A Stalemate with Symbolism

The minimax equilibrium falls at (2, -2), a diplomatic stalemate. The US keeps the pressure on, but Russia refuses to give in.

This aligns with typical procurement scenarios where a dominant supplier refuses to budge, and the buyer, bound by governance constraints, can’t afford to make risky concessions. The outcome is a cold peace—both sides keep the conversation open but walk away with no real gains.

Don't forget another elephant in the room!

An external force must alter the game’s structure to move beyond minimax deadlock. In procurement, this could be alternative supply sources, regulatory changes, or long-term incentives.

In diplomacy, China may introduce indirect incentives—economic deals, security assurances, or political agreements—to make a (5,3) outcome (mutual partial concessions) more appealing.

AI instead of Horoscopes and Tarot Cards

Being Ukrainian, I take this close to heart. So, I suggest yet another application of AI—an impartial view with ice-cold logic instead of listening to political observers as trustworthy as Tarot and horoscopes.